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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000309-SC 
v. : 
CAMERON THOMAS LOPES, : 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly modify defendant's sentence by deleting the "in-
concert" enhancement, which this Court in State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, held 
had been unconstitutionally imposed? 
This issue turns on the trial court's findings concerning the interpretation of 
defendant's plea agreement and this Court's opinion in Lopes. The appellate court reviews 
the trial court's factual using a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,939 
n. 4 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). However, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on these findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. See id., 869 P.2d at 
936-39. "A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which 
we review for correctness." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Controlling constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 16; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, -203.1 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1, -4 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999); 
Rules 11 and 28, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Defendant, Cameron Thomas Lopes, was charged with murder, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1996) (R. 12-17). The information alleged that 
in the early morning of February 22, 1996, defendant, along with others as parties to the 
offense, went to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill the residents in 
retaliation for another shooting one week earlier (R. 14-15). There they found Joey Miera 
asleep on the floor, and through an open window shot him twice in the head with a .20 gauge 
shotgun, killing him (R. 14). 
The information also gave notice to defendant that he was subject to enhanced 
penalties for the use of a firearm and for having acted in concert with two or more persons, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203( 1) (Supp. 2000)("firearm enhancement") and 76-3-
2 
203.1 (1995) ("in concert enhancement'1), respectively (R. 13).l Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, defendant waived a preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound over to district 
court (R. 18-19). 
In the trial court, before Judge Sandra Peuler, defendant moved to strike section 76-3-
203.1 as unconstitutional (R. 38-79). The trial court denied defendant's motion, making 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order (R. 94-100). Thereafter, 
defendant pleaded guilty to murder and acquiesced in the court's sentencing him under the 
gun and in-concert enhancements, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. He 
conditioned his plea to the imposition of the in-concert enhancement on the right to appeal 
the court's order rejecting his challenges to the constitutionality of that enhancement, 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 18-19, 103; R. 1, 14-16, 18-
19).2 The court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-to-life term on the murder conviction 
(R. 113). The court sentenced defendant to a consecutive one-to-five year term on the 
1
 Following this Court's opinion in State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, 
section 76-3-203.1 was substantively amended. See 2000 Utah Laws ch. 214, § 2. 
Therefore, citations in this brief are to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), under which 
the enhanced penalty was imposed. Also, this brief refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the 
"in-concert" enhancement," although it is popularly, though incorrectly, referred to as the 
"gang enhancement" See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ^ 2 n. 1. 
2
 In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the 
following pending cases: No. 961900546, discharge of a firearm at a person or building, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1995); No. 961900547, 
tampering with evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
510 (1995); and No. 961900816, aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995) (R. 103; 363:1, 22). 
3 
firearm enhancement (R. 114). The court also imposed a consecutive four-year term 
following its entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law under subsection (5)(c) of the 
in-concert enhancement (R. 114, 117, 122-25).3 
Defendant appealed the trial court's imposition of the in-concert enhancement to this 
Court. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 (attached at Addendum B). This Court concluded that 
the enhancement was essentially a separate offense each of whose elements must be proven 
to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at f^ 15. The Court found that the "in 
concert" element of the enhancement had been determined by the trial court, rather than a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at f 17. Therefore, the Court found that subsection (5)(c) 
of the enhancement, which authorized the trial court to make findings as to the applicability 
of the enhancement, unconstitutionally violated defendant's right to a jury trial under article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Id. Consequently, the Court reversed the imposition 
of the enhancement and "remandfed] for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Id. 
at U22. 
On remand, defendant moved before Judge Dennis M. Fuchs, for a new trial on both 
the murder and the in-concert offenses (R. 234-36). The prosecution opposed defendant's 
3
 The imposition of a consecutive four-year term was technically incorrect under 
the then-applicable in-concert enhancement. See section 76-3-203.1 (3)(e) (Supp. 1996) 
(providing for a minimum term of nine years if the enhanced conviction is a first degree 
felony). Although the judgment reflects this error, the court did recognize the correct 
sentence in its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the enhancement and in 
sentencing defendant (R. 125; 365:21). 
4 
motion, arguing that this Court's remand order directed only retrial on the latter offense (R. 
334-40 at 338). The prosecutor also argued that defendant's plea contemplated defendant's 
right to withdraw only his plea to the imposition of the in-concert offense if he prevailed on 
that issue (R. 334-40). In consequence of both this Court's remand order in Lopes, and the 
terms of the conditional plea, the prosecution moved to dismiss defendant's plea to the in-
concert enhancement and to strike that part of the sentence (R. 337). 
Judge Fuchs granted the motion (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, R. 
343-45, attached at Addendum C). Consequently, he dismissed the in-concert charge, deleted 
it from defendant's sentence, and denied defendant's motion for a new trial on both the 
murder and in-concert offenses (R. 344).4 Defendant timely appealed from this latter ruling 
(R. 350). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The relevant facts are set out in the preceding section and are developed in the 
argument portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly modified defendant's sentence by deleting that portion 
attributable to the in-concert enhancement following the prosecution's motion to dismiss the 
charge and this Court's opinion in Lopes. Defendant's claim that Lopes recognized an 
4
 An undocketed, signed minute entry reflects the trial court's ruling, reimposing 
the original sentence absent the in-concert charge (R. 342). 
5 
"enhanced offense" which included both the in-concert elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (1995) and the underlying offense of murder was not preserved in the trial court. 
Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider the claim. In any event, Lopes's repeated 
reference to the "enhancement offense," which incorporates elements over and above the 
underlying offense of murder, as opposed to the "enhanced offense" postulated by defendant, 
shows that this Court did not disturb the independent existence of defendant's murder 
conviction. Further, both the colloquy in defendant's plea hearing and Lopes'$ discussion 
of the enhancement show that defendant and this Court recognized defendant's plea as 
conditional only as to the in-concert enhancement and not to his guilty plea to murder. The 
record shows that defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled separately to murder and 
conditionally to the enhancement, accepting the possibility that he might not be able to 
withdraw his guilty plea to murder if he was successful in challenging the in-concert 




DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENT 
CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THIS COURT'S REMAND 
ORDER IN LOPES', IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS COURT IN LOPES, IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA, REMANDED THE CASE FOR 
RETRIAL ONLY ON THE ENHANCEMENT OFFENSE, LEAVING 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS TO MURDER AND THE 
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT INTACT AND THAT DEFENDANT 
PLED CONDITIONALLY ONLY TO THE IN-CONCERT 
ENHANCEMENT 
Defendant argues that in reimposing his conviction for murder and dismissing the in-
concert charge, the trial court improperly modified this Court's order of remand in Lopes. 
Aplt. Br. at 6-13. Specifically, defendant asserts that this Court found that section 76-3-
203.1 created a new offense — in effect, in-concert murder — which transformed the 
underlying murder conviction into an enhanced offense fully embracing the underlying 
crime. Aplt. Br. at 7, 26, 29. Thus, defendant argues, the remand order in Lopes required 
the lower court to vacate the murder conviction and grant him a retrial on the in-concert 
murder. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. Not only is this claim unpreserved, it also misconstrues Lopes. 
Defendant also argues that trial court mistakenly ruled that his guilty plea to murder 
was unconditional and only his guilty plea to the in-concert enhancement was conditional, 
to wit: that he entered "a bifurcated plea." Aplt. Br. at 14,20. Although defendant nowhere 
explicitly states how he was prejudiced by this alleged misconstruction of his plea, he 
apparently urges that as a result of the trial court's misunderstanding it improperly reimposed 
his murder conviction. Lopes, he argues, implicitly recognizes that his pleas to both offenses 
7 
were conditional Aplt. Br. at 15,25-26. Alternatively, defendant claims that if the plea was 
conditional only as to the enhancement, he should now be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
to murder because it was not knowing and voluntary. Aplt. Br. at 14, 20. This argument 
misconstrues the plea-taking. 
A. Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the nature of 
this Court's remand order in Lopes. 
Defendant argues that in denying his motion for a trial on murder and deleting from 
his sentence the in-concert enhancement after the prosecution moved to dismiss it the trial 
court improperly modified this Court's remand order in Lopes. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. At the 
heart of defendant's argument is a mistaken assumption: "[I]n Lopes /, this Court recognized 
that the gang enhancement statute had the effect of transforming an underlying offense into 
a new, greater, enhanced offense with a higher punishment. Thus, the 'enhanced offense' 
consisted of the elements of the underlying crime and the [sjection 76-3-203.1 elements." 
Aplt. Br. at 29. Therefore, defendant concludes that when this Court found "a new and 
separate offense" and remanded for a "new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge," see 
Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 22, the Court had effectively melded the underlying murder 
conviction with the enhancement, and remanded for a new trial on a single charge that might 
be called "in-concert murder." This claim, however, is unpreserved. Not only did defendant 
not present this argument to the trial court, he specifically recognized that the murder charge 
and the enhancement charge were separate by requesting "a jury trial on both the homicide 
charge and the companion gang enhancement charge" (R. 235). 
8 
"Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider an issue... raised 
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error." State v. Helmick, 
2000 UT 70, [^8, 9 P.3d 164 (refusing to consider challenge to eyewitness reliability not 
presented to trial court) (citation omitted). See also State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 
(Utah 1993) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, this court will not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal."). "Generally there is no justification for not presenting all 
available grounds in support of a motion to suppress, and in the absence of special 
circumstances, an appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court." 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
(same). See also Onglnt'l v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993) 
(refusing to distinguish between new grounds as opposed to new issues and thereby declining 
to consider the merits first raised on appeal, citing Carter and Lee). 
"The policy behind requiring an appellant to first raise an issue in the trial court is one 
of judicial economy and orderly procedure." State in re M. M. J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah 
App. 1995) (citing Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (stating 
"orderly procedure requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory or theories 
to the trial court, and he cannot thereafter urge a different theory")). 'The underlying 
considerations of this policy involve allowing the trial court the opportunity to consider, and 
perhaps correct, an error claimed by the appellant." Id. (citing Utah County v. Brown, 672 
P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983)). See also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) 
9 
(same) (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983)); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that a trial court has an opportunity to rule only 
if "the issue [has been] specifically raised"). 
Defendant asserts that his claim, that Lopes recognized a single "enhanced offense" 
embracing the underlying murder and the in-concert enhancement, is preserved by his 
memorandum supporting his right to a jury trial ("Memorandum," R. 234-84) and the hearing 
on his motion for a jury trial following this Court's remand order in Lopes ("Hearing," R. 
364:1-17). Aplt. Br. at 3. However, the record shows defendant never presented such a 
claim to Judge Fuchs. See Memorandum (R. 234-84); hearing (R. 364:1-17). In fact, 
contradicting this very claim, defendant specifically requested a trial on his murder 
conviction in addition to his request for a trial on the in-concert charge. See (R. 235) ("Mr. 
Lopes now contends that he should be given a jury trial on both the homicide charge and the 
companion gang enhancement charge ").5 In sum, because defendant failed to preserve 
his claim that "in Lopes I this Court recognized that the gang enhancement statute had the 
effect of transforming an underlying offense into a new, greater, enhanced offense," see Aplt. 
Br. at 29, this Court should decline to consider it. 
5
 Two pages from defendant's memorandum are missing from the record (R. 234-
36). However, any reference by defense counsel to defendant's "enhanced offense" 
theory is also completely absent from the transcript of the hearing (R. 364:1-17), further 
indicating that the theory was never presented to the trial court. 
10 
B. This Court's remand order in Lopes directed a retrial only as to the 
"section 76-3-203.1 charge," a "new and separate offense," and left 
defendant's plea to murder and the firearm enhancement intact. 
In any event, defendant's claim that this Court in Lopes created an enhanced offense 
which "transformed" the underlying offense into a greater offense, thereby nullifying the 
independent existence of the underlying offense, seriously misconstrues the scope of this 
Court's assessment of the in-concert offense and the remand order. 
Nowhere in Lopes does this Court speak to the creation of a single "enhanced offense" 
as defendant has conceptualized it. In recognizing that the legislature created "a separate and 
new offense," see Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ]^16, the Court's speaks only of an offense whose 
elements are over and above those of the underlying offense rather than of an offense which 
incorporates the underlying offense. See id, ("When the legislature passed the gang 
enhancement provision, it acted just as it did when it passed the firearm enhancement 
provision: it mandated imposition of an enhancement only upon proof of elements over and 
above those required for the crime of lesser consequence."); id. at % 17 ("Even though Lopes 
pled guilty to the underlying offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental state of 
the other actors, as is necessary to support imposition of the gang enhancement. His plea, 
then, did not establish all of the elements of the enhancement offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.") (emphasis added); id. at f21 ("We reverse and remand for a new trial on the gang 
enhancement charge") (emphasis added); id. at ^ 22 ("We reverse and remand for a new 
trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge") (emphasis added). The repeated reference to an 
11 
"enhancement" offense, as opposed to an "enhanced" offense indicates this Court's 
recognition that the new offense was defined by the additional "in-concert" elements 
provided by section 76-3-203.1. Nowhere does the Court suggest that the underlying murder 
has lost its independent existence by virtue of the creation of the new offense. The plain 
reading of the remand order is that this Court ordered a retrial on the "enhancement offense," 
not an "enhanced offense" incorporating, and thereby nullifying, the underlying murder.6 
Further, defendant's claim implicitly suggests that Lopes created many new 
"enhanced" offenses, each incorporating the underlying offenses enumerated in section 76-3-
203.1(4), e.g., in-concert robbery, in-concert aggravated assault, etc.. However, subsection 
(4) merely identifies those offenses to which the enhancement offense may be applied. 
Nowhere in Lopes does the Court suggest that it intended to introduce numerous new 
6
 Plainly, this Court is well aware that it could not nullify the murder conviction by 
''fransforming" it into a greater offense and then ordering the prosecution to go forward 
on it, as defendant essentially argues. Aplt. Br. 8-13. The prosecution of criminal laws is 
a function of the legislature which is delegated to public prosecutors. Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 16 ("The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall 
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions . . . . " ) . Prosecutors, 
not the courts, control the initiation and dismissal of prosecutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-2-1 (Utah 1999) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed 
charging the commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a 
prosecuting attorney."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1 (Utah 1999) ("After commencement of 
a prosecution the prosecutor may, upon reasonable grounds, move the magistrate before 
whom the prosecution is pending to dismiss the prosecution. If, in the judgment of the 
magistrate, the prosecution should not continue, he may dismiss the prosecution and enter 
an order of dismissal stating the reasons for the dismissal in the order."). Based on this 
substantial authority, this Court would not have melded defendant's underlying murder 
conviction with the new, section 76-3-203.1 charge, thereby nullifying the murder charge 
and conclusively precluding the prosecution from pursuing it. 
12 
offenses not specifically defined in the criminal code. 
In sum, the remand "for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge" contemplated 
a trial only on the additional in-concert elements of the new statutory offense, leaving 
defendant's plea to murder undisturbed. Therefore, the trial court did not act improperly on 
this Court's remand order when, following the prosecutions' motion, it dismissed the 
"section 76-3-201.1 charge" see Lopes 1999 UT 24 at ^22, and modified defendant's 
sentence to show convictions for murder and the firearm enhancement. 
Even if defendant was correct in claiming that Lopes created an enhanced offense 
combining the elements of the section 76-3-203.1 offense with the underlying offense in a 
greater-lesser offense relationship, see Aplt. Br. at 15, 27-28, 30, the trial court still acted 
within its discretion in reimposing the murder conviction and dismissing the section 76-3-
203.1 charge. Defendant cites rule 28(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 30(b), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in support of his claim that the trial court improperly 
modified Lopes' remand "for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Aplt. Br. at 8-
10. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 22. Indeed, both rules specify that "[i]f a judgment of conviction 
is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the appellate court." Utah 
R. Crim P. 28(a); Utah R. App. P. 30(b). Defendant's reliance on these rules is entirely 
misplaced. The rules plainly direct the general course of proceedings following a 
defendant's successful appeal of an issue amenable to retrial following a reversal on appeal. 
No citation to authority is necessary, however, to recognize that the prosecution may dismiss 
13 
a charge successfully appealed, i.e., the enhancement charge, and that, as a result, the trial 
court would not be compelled to uselessly conduct a trial the prosecution had no interest in 
pursuing. Defendant's claim would compel needless expense of judicial and State resources 
for no purpose other than to follow a rule never intended to produce such a result in such 
circumstances. In this case, the prosecution declined the opportunity to pursue the section 
76-3-203.1 charge on retrial, and the trial court acted properly in dismissing the charge. 
Finally, likening the relationship between the section 76-3-203.1 offense and the 
underlying offense to a greater and lesser included offense, defendant mistakenly argues that 
even if this Court left open whether the trial court could modify its remand order, the court 
lacked statutory authority to do so under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999). Aplt. Br. 
at 15, 27-28, 30. Section 76-1-402 provides: 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of 
a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999) (emphasis added). Because he did not request the 
reimposition of his murder conviction, defendant claims that the trial court acted in 
contravention of section 76-1-402(5). Defendant's argument fails for several reasons. First, 
as discussed above, Lopes does not make murder a lesser included offense of the section 76-
3-203.1 offense; the latter is a "separate" offense. Lopes 1999 UT 24 at % 16. Second, section 
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76-1-402(5) contemplates a scenario in which there has been a conviction only of the greater 
offense and not of the lesser offense. In this case, however, defendant was convicted of the 
lesser offense through his guilty plea. Third, although defendant sought a trial on the murder 
conviction on remand, he did request the entry of his conviction on the "lesser" murder 
charge when he voluntarily and unconditionally entered his guilty plea to that offense. Thus, 
section 76-1 -402(5) would not curtail the trial court's power to reimpose defendant's murder 
conviction in this case. 
In sum, the trial court correctly recognized the scope of this Court's remand order in 
Lopes, and accordingly, correctly allowed the prosecution to dismiss the in-concert charge 
and modified defendant's sentence to reflect his murder and firearm enhancement 
convictions. 
C Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded unconditionally 
guilty to murder and conditionally guilty to the in-concert offense. 
On remand from this Court, Judge Fuchs reviewed the transcript of the change of plea 
hearing and correctly concluded that defendant was "entitled to a trial on the § 76-3-203.1 
(gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide charge with firearm enhancement" 
(R. 343-44). In support of that conclusion, the court made the following findings of fact: (1) 
defendant had entered separate pleas to the criminal homicide charge and to the in-concert 
and firearm enhancements at his change of plea hearing; (2) defendant pleaded conditionally 
only as to the in-concert enhancement; (3) "Judge Peuler made it very understandable to 
defendant that one possible effect of a successful appeal of her ruling on the constitutionality 
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of the gang enhancement would be that he might not be able to withdraw his guilty plea to 
the criminal homicide charge, but rather only have his sentence adjusted; and (4) "[t]he 
remand from the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Lopes, ordered only that the defendant be 
allowed 'a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge'" (R. 343-44). 
The colloquy at the plea hearing, attached in its entirety at Addendum D, fully 
supports the court's findings and conclusion: 
THE COURT [Judge Peuler]: All right. Now I understand that this plea 
today is in the nature of what we call a Ceri [sic] plea. 
MR. PETERSON [Defense Counsel]: That's true, Judge. 
THE COURT: Have you gone over that kind of a plea agreement with your 
attorney, Mr. Lopes. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the record, I've explained to Mr. Lopes 
that we will be potentially appealing the Court's application of a 
minimum mandatory gang enhancement sentence in this case based 
on your previous legal ruling where we asked the Court to declare 
the gang enhancement statute unconstitutional. And Mr. Lopes 
understands we will be pursuing that appeal even after the time he is 
sentenced in this case. 
Is that true? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that when you enter a guilty 
plea today, I will go ahead and if I find it appropriate, receive your 
guilty plea and then I will go ahead and sentence you. If your 
attorney and you decide to appeal the pretrial ruling and you prevail 
on appeal, that is the appellate court decides that I was wrong, and 
the gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional then you would be 
allowed to withdraw your guilty plea. 
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However, if you appeal and you loose [sic], and the appellate court 
says that I was right, then you're stuck, basically. You can't ask the 
Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea. In other words, what you 
do today would be permanent. Did I make a mis-statement? 
MR. YBARRA [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I believe that if the appeal's [sic] 
court finds that the gang enhancement is not constitutional, it would 
simply, it would be a modification of his sentence. It wouldn't be an 
admission to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YBARRA: We'd simply strike out that part of the sentence. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding? 
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's not clear. Unfortunately under Gibbons it's 
unclear whether it would invalidate, inviciate [sic] the whole plea and 
whether we would have to re-enter a five to li[f]e plea or not, but 
Mr. Ybarra may be correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Lopes ought to understand what's possible 
under a worse case scenario so I believe that it's possible under a 
reading of the case on Mr. Lopez [sic] that if the appellate court says 
that I was wrong on the gang enhancement statute that you may not be 
able to withdraw your guilty [sic], you may simply have your 
sentence adjusted. Now, I understand that there may also be a 
possibility that you could withdraw your guilty plea at that time but 
I'm not certain about that and I don't know if anybody is at this point. 
MR. PETERSON: We're not, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you understand the possibility? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other questions that you want to 
ask your attorney or the Court before we go any further, Mr. Lopes? 
MR. PETERSON: I don't have anything, your Honor. 
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MR. YBARRA: I don't believe so, Judge. 
(R. 363:14-16) (emphasis added). 
The foregoing colloquy shows that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a 
conditional guilty plea only as to the section 76-3-203.1 charge. The prosecutor stated his 
belief that defendant would not be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to murder even if he 
prevailed on appeal, a belief defense counsel acknowledged "may be correct." Accordingly, 
the trial court informed defendant that if he was successful on appeal he might be not be able 
to withdraw his guilty plea to murder. The court did not qualify or restrict its ultimate 
authority to find that defendant's plea was only partly conditional. Thus, with knowledge of 
this "possibility," the prosecution's understanding, and his own counsel's begrudging 
agreement, defendant readily agreed to enter a guilty plea to murder and to accept the court's 
imposition of the gun and in-concert enhancements. 
Moreover, Judge Fuchs correctly recognized that the proceedings before Judge Peuler 
showed that defendant pled separately to the murder charge and the enhancements and that 
his plea was conditional only as to the in-concert charge. After eliciting defendant's 
understanding of the possible outcomes of his plea, Judge Peuler read the criminal homicide 
charge and the firearm and in-concert enhancements as set out in the information. The 
following colloquy ensued: 
THE COURT: To the charge, Mr. Lopes, as I've announced, how do you 
plead, sir? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, could you take that a piece at a time if you 
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don't mind. Because I've got to preserve Ceri [sic] exactly. 
THE COURT: All right, as - -
MR. PETERSON: Well - - I'm sorry, go ahead. 
THE COURT: As to Count One, criminal homicide murder, a first degree 
felony, Mr. Mierra [sic], excuse me, Mr. Lopes, having caused the 
death of Mr. Mierra [sic].7 How do you plead, sir? 
MR. LOPES: I plead guilty to the last alternative, under the last alternative. 
THE COURT: As to evidencing depraved indifference to human life that 
you engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death of 
another and thereby caused the death of Joey Mierra [sic]? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I do find, Mr. Lopes, that your plea is knowingly 
and voluntarily made. I'll therefore receive it and enter it as a 
conviction at this time. 
As to the other two portions of that, Mr. Peterson, how do you wish 
to proceed? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we wish to enter Ceri [sic] plea relative to 
the gang enhancement provision under 76-3-203.1. If you want to 
inquire about this plea, I would advise Cameron Lopes to say guilty 
under State v. Ceri [sic] 
THE COURT: All right. As to the gang enhancement statute found at 
76-3-203.1, as to that enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead? 
MR. LOPES: Guilty under State versus Ceri [sic]. 
THE COURT: All right. And as to the firearm enhancement, Mr. Lopes, 
7
 The victim's last name is consistently spelled, "Miera," throughout the 
proceedings. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ^ 2. 
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how do you plead? 
MR. LOPES: Guilty as a party to the offense. 
THE COURT: All right. I do find that you plea of guilty to all of the above 
is knowingly and voluntarily made. I'll therefore enter them as a 
conviction at this time. 
(R. 18-19). 
The foregoing colloquy supports Judge Fuch's findings of fact. In particular, the 
colloquy plainly shows that, upon the deliberate and unchallenged advice of counsel, 
defendant separately pled guilty to murder and to each enhancement and that only 
defendant's plea to the in-concert enhancement was preserved under Sery. 
The individual and separable nature of defendant's guilty plea to murder is reinforced 
by defendant's plea affidavit. The affidavit indicates that defendant is entering a guilty plea 
to "criminal homicide/murder," which term is immediately followed by an asterisk. The 
asterisk refers the reader to the basis for the murder plea: "In exchange for this plea, the 
State will dismiss Third District Court (Division I) cases 961900547 (Evid Tamp), 
961900546 (Disch Firearm), and 961900816 (Ag Arson)" (Statement of Defendant, R. 103-
09, at 103, attached at Addendum E), Only below and after the asterisk does the affidavit 
state, in parenthesis, that "[T]he court may impose an enhanced sentence by applying the 
firearm enhancement and/or gang enhancement" (R. 103). Further, the affidavit, signed by 
defendant only two days before the change of plea hearing, nowhere indicates that the guilty 
plea to murder is conditional (R. 103-09). In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that 
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defendant was only "entitled to a trial on the § 76-3-203.1 (gang enhancement) charge, not 
on the criminal homicide charge with gun enhancement" (R. 343-44). 
In various ways defendant asserts that if the plea was only conditional as to the in-
concert enhancement, the plea was unknowing and involuntary and he should now be 
allowed to withdraw it. Aplt. Br. at 14,20,23. Thus, he argues, the prosecution should have 
more clearly stated that the plea was "bifurcated" (Aplt. Br. at 15) and that the State on 
appeal led this Court to believe the plea was conditional in its entirety (Aplt. Br. at 23-25). 
Defendant's first assertion, that his plea was unknowing and involuntary as a result of the 
prosecution's failure to more clearly define the plea, is unsupported on the record recited 
above. 
Defendant's second assertion, that the State on appeal led this Court to believe the 
plea was conditional in its entirety, is equally unfounded. In support of this contention, 
defendant first recites the State's rendition of the trial court's taking in his plea from the 
"Statement of the Case and Facts," in the State's responsive brief. Aplt. Br. at 23-24 (citing 
Aple. Br. at 3-4). These statements do not categorically define the nature of the plea, and 
even if they did suggest that the entire plea was conditional it would hardly affect the true 
nature of defendant's actual plea. Moreover, the extent to which the plea was conditional 
and unconditional was not at issue in Lopes. Rather, the State was focused on defendant's 
challenges to the legality of the in-concert enhancement and not on the precision of its 
rendition of unrelated procedural facts. Thus, any suggestion that the State was definitively 
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proclaiming the detailed nature of the plea is misplaced. 
Defendant also attempts to bolster his accusation that the State led this Court to 
believe that the plea was entirely conditional by arguing that the State failed to clarify its 
understanding of the plea in its petition for rehearing. Aplt. Br. at 24-25. In so arguing, 
defendant assumes that this Court's remand order embraces his view that the plea was 
entirely conditional and that this Court's references to the new "section 76-3-203.1 charge" 
included the charge for murder under section 76-5-203. As argued below, defendant's 
assumption is mistaken. This Court's remand order directed only a "new trial on the section 
76-3-203.1 charge," that is, on the "in concert" enhancement. Taking the remand order at 
face value, the State felt no need to clarify its understanding of the plea. 
Moreover, defendant's alternative claim, that if his plea is determined to have been 
only partly conditional then it was unknowing and involuntary and he should be allowed to 
withdraw it, is made too late. Any request to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within 
30 days after the entry of the plea, where, as here, defendant was advised of the time limit 
(R. 363:19). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) (1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e). 
Therefore, even if defendant's plea were unknowing and involuntary, the trial court would 
lack jurisdiction to set aside the plea. See State v. Tarnwiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^ | 8, 5 P.3d 
1222 (holding that because the thirty-day time period for moving to withdraw a guilty plea 
is jurisdictional, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw the plea of 
a defendant informed of the period filed after the thirty-day period) (citing State v. Price, 837 
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P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App.1992)). 
In sum, neither the prosecution nor the State on appeal led defendant or this Court to 
misconstrue the true nature of his partially conditional plea, a conclusion Judge Fuchs 
reasonably and fully concurred with. As such, defendant's conditional plea only as to the in-
concert enhancement was knowing and voluntary. Any request to withdraw the plea is both 
unfounded and untimely. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction and enhanced sentence. 
4* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J / _ day of January, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney, General 
/ KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 16. [Public prosecutors.] 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall 
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in 
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided 
by statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecu-
tor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to ap-
point a prosecutor pro tempore. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be 
for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree,.for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm 
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any other 
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less 
than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concur-
rently. 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grandjury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum terra of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persona with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-2-1. Authorization to file information. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the 
commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a 
prosecuting attorney. 
77-2-4. Dismissal of prosecution. 
After commencement of a prosecution the prosecutor may, upon reasonable 
grounds, move the magistrate before whom the prosecution is pending to 
dismiss the prosecution. If, in the judgment of the magistrate, the prosecution 
should not continue, he may dismiss the prosecution and enter an order of 
dismissal stating the reasons for the dismissal in the order. 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
( D A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be baaed on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
Rule 28. Disposition after appeal. 
(a) If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other 
proceeding, the defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or other-
wise restricted as the trial court on remand determines proper. If no further 
trial or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and 
a defendant restricted by bail or otherwise shall be released from restriction 
and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or property refunded to the 
proper person. 
(b) Upon affirmance by the appellate court, the judgment or order affirmed 
or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, within 30 days after receir* 
of the remittitur, the trial court shall notify the parties and place the m a S 
the calendar for review. ^ w o n 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or 
otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of 
fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the 
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as 
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new triad is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary 
to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new 
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order 
affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, 
decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the reasons shall be stated concisely 
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or 
dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the 
entry of the judgment of the court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes 
that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the 
case by order without written opinion. The decision shall have only such effect 
as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk 
shall give notice to the respective parties and make the decision public in 
accordance with the direction of the court, 
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Defendant pled guilty in the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Sandra N. 
Peuler, J., to charge of murder, with firearm 
and gang enhancements, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) application of "gang enhancement" 
statute to enhance sentence of defendant 
convicted of murder violated defendant's due 
process rights, and (2) subsection of gang 
enhancement statute which provides that tri-
al judge, rather than jury, will decide 
whether to impose enhancement violated de-
fendant's right to jury trial under state con-
stitution. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Russon, J.v filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Howe, C.J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law 3=» 1134(3) 
A constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which the Su-
preme Court reviews for correctness 
2. Constitutional Law <&»48(1,3) 
When addressing a constitutional chal-
lenge to the validity of a statute, the Su-
preme Court presumes that the statute is 
valid, and resolves any reasonable doubts in 
favor of constitutionality. 
3. Criminal Law <£»13<2) 
The legislature has broad authority to 
define crimes and prescribe punishments. 
4. Criminal Law <3=»1208.6<l) 
Under "gang enhancement" statute, 
state is required to prove that all three ac-
tors: (1) possessed a mental state sufficient 
• LOPES Utah 191 
191 (Utah 1999) 
to commit the same underlying offense; and 
(2) directly committed the underlying offense 
or solicited, requested, commanded, encour-
aged, or intentionally aided one of the other 
two actors to engage in conduct constituting 
the underlying offense. U.C.A.1953. 76-3-
203.1(l)(a, b). 
5. Criminal Law <3»1208.6<1) 
For purposes of gang enhancement stat-
ute, phrase "in concert" means that the de-
fendant acted with at least two other people 
and that those other persons must also be 
liable for the underlying offense. U.C.A. 
1953,76-3-203.1(l)(a,b). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
6. Constitutional Law <3=>27(X2) 
Criminal Law <s=>1208.6<5) 
Application of "gang enhancement" stat-
ute to enhance sentence of defendant con-
victed of murder violated defendant's clue 
process rights, where state failed to prove 
accomplices1 criminal culpability beyond a 
reasonable doubt U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
2Q3.1(l)(a, b). 
7. Jury ^31.1 
Gang enhancement statute creates new 
offense separate from that underlying en-
hancement, and thus subsection of statute 
which provides that trial judge, rather than 
jury, will decide whether to impose enhance-
ment violated defendant's right to jury trial 
under state constitution. Const Art 1, § 12; 
U.C A1953, 76-3-203.1(l)(a, b) 
8. Constitutional Law <s»48U) 
Statutes, where possible, are to be con-
strued so as to sustain their constitutionality. 
9. Statutes **to(l) 
If a portion of an otherwise unconstitu-
tional statute might be saved by severing the 
unconstitutional provision, such should be 
done. 
10. Statutes <s=»64(l) 
To determine if a statute is severable 
from its unconstitutional subsection, the Su-
preme Court looks to legislative intent 
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11. Statutes <3=>64(1) 
If the legislative intent behind a statute 
is not expressly stated, the Supreme Court, 
in order to determine the severability of an 
unconstitutional provision, then turns to the 
statute itself, and examines the remaining 
constitutional portion of the statute in rela-
tion to the stricken portion. 
12. Statutes ^64(1) 
If the portion of the statute remaining 
after an unconstitutional provision is stricken 
is operable and still furthers the intended 
legislative purpose, the statute will be al-
lowed to stand. 
13. Statutes e»64(6) 
Subsection of gang enhancement statute 
which unconstitutionally requires trial judge, 
rather than jury, to decide whether to impose 
enhancement, would be severed from remain-
der of statute; severance would not destroy 
statute's purpose of imposing higher penal-
ties when offense is committed by three per-
sons acting in concert. Const Art 1, § 12; 
U.CA.1953,76-£-203.1(l)(a, b). 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Kenneth A. Bron-
ston, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Linda M. Jones, Michael A. Peterson, Kim-
beriy A. Clark, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
11 Cameron Thomas Lopes appeals from 
a judgment and conviction for murder, a first 
degree felony, and enhanced sentences im-
posed by the district court pursuant to sec-
tions 76-3-203(1) and -203.1 of the Utah 
Code. Lopes asks this court to reverse the 
group criminal activity enhancement on the 
basis that section 76-3-203.1 violates both 
the federal and Utah constitutions. We hold 
1. Lopes refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the 
"gang" enhancement statute. The State correct-
ly points out in its brief that the legislature did 
not create a "gang" enhancement although the 
statute is popularly known by that name. We 
agree with the State that referring to the statute 
as a "group criminal activity" enhancement is 
more accurate than "gang" enhancement Nev-
ertheless, we have previously referred to the stat-
ute under its commonly known name, see Stat* v. 
that the application of section 76-3-203.1 in 
this case did deprive Lopes of certain funda-
mental constitutional rights. Furthermore, 
we hold subsection (5)(c) of section 76-3-
203.1 violates the Utah Constitution. We, 
therefore, reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
112 In March of 1996, the State charged 
Lopes and several other individuals with 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-6-203 of the Utah Code. The in-
formation alleged that early in the morning 
of February 22, 1996, Lopes, along with 
three other persons who were parties to the 
offense, went to the residence of Jimmy De-
Herrera with the intent to kill the occupants. 
One of the defendants fired two shots from a 
.20 gauge shotgun into an open window. 
Both shots hit and killed Joey Miera, who 
was asleep on the floor. The information 
further alleged that the defendants shot Mi-
era in retaliation for another shooting one 
week earlier that killed one of the defen-
dant's friends. The information also gave 
notice to Lopes that he was subject to en-
hanced penalties for the use of a firearm, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) 
(Supp.1998) ("firearm enhancement"), and for 
having acted in concert with two or more 
persons, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activity" or 
"gang" enhancement).1 Lopes waived his 
preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound 
over to the district court 
13 In the district court, Lopes moved to 
strike the gang enhancement as unconstitu-
tional under both the state and federal con-
stitutions. The court denied his motion. 
Thereafter, he pleaded guilty to the homicide 
offense, with enhancements, in exchange for 
dismissal of charges pending against him in 
another case. Lopes conditioned his plea 
pursuant to StaU v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
CtApp.l988).a Lopes's conditional plea pre-
Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450. 461 (Utah 1994), and we 
will continue to do so for ease of reference. 
2. The Sery decision, which this court has en-
dorsed, see State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344, 1344-
45 (Utah 1997); Utah RXrim. P. I l(i). permits a 
criminal defendant to plead guilty while preserv-
ing issues for appeal. In this case, Lopes specifi-
cally preserved his right to appeal the constitu-
tionality of the gang enhancement statute. 
STATE v. LOPES 
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served his right to challenge the constitution- Separationists, 
ality of the gang enhancement statute. 
if 4 Thereafter, the trial court issued find-
ings that Lopes was subject to an enhanced 
penalty under section 76-3-203.1 and entered 
judgment against him.3 The trial court sen-
tenced Lopes to an indeterminate term of 
five years to life. The court also enhanced 
the sentence under the gang enhancement 
statute, sentencing Lopes to an additional 
four years to "run consecutively and not con-
currently with the basic sentence." Lopes 
appeals that order. 
15 Lopes contends that the gang enhance-
ment statute creates a separate criminal of-
fense by combining a separate mental ele-
ment— "in concert"—with a criminal act and, 
therefore, for the statute to satisfy state and 
federal due process concerns, the State must 
prove the elements of the enhancement be-
yond a reasonable doubt, as with any other 
crime. He also asserts that section 76-3-
203.1(5)(c) interferes with his right to a jury 
trial, as guaranteed by article L section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution.4 
C'tah 193 
Inc v. Whitehead 870 P.2d 
916, 920 (Utah 1993): Mountain States Tel 
& Tel Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P„2d 184, 
187 (Utah 1991). 
[3) 1 7 In response to Lopes's argument 
that in enacting the gang enhancement stat-
ute, the legislature created a new crime, the 
State notes that the legislature specifically 
expressed an intent that the gang enhance-
ment not be a separate offense. The legisla-
ture does have broad authority to define 
crimes and prescribe punishments. See 
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Utah 
1986); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 
(Utah 1978). However, although the legisla-
ture specifically stated in the statute that it 
intended section 76-3-203.1 to be an en-
hancement, this is not dispositive as to what 
the legislature actually did. 
[1,21 1 6 A constitutional challenge to a 
statute presents a question of law, which 
we review for correctness. See State v. 
Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 996 (Utah 1996). 
When addressing such a challenge, this 
court presumes that the statute is valid, 
and we resolve any reasonable doubts in 
favor of constitutionality. See Society of 
3. Lopes objected to the first paragraph of the 
judge's findings and conclusions regarding appli-
cability of the gang enhancement statute because 
the judge had suggested that the. issue was 
waived. As first written, that paragraph stated: 
In his Statement of Defendant [sic] executed in 
connection with his entry of guilty plea and in 
his colloquy with die court the defendant 
although challenging its constitutionality, ac-
knowledged the applicability of the gang en-
hancement as pleaded by the state. 
After objection, the first paragraph was changed 
to read: 
Defendant admitted that he went with at least 
two other people to Joey Miera s home for the 
purpose of retaliating for a fellow gang mem-
bers shooting, and with the stated purpose of 
"[gettling the punka." 
By making this modification, the trial court 
acknowledged that Lopes never conceded that all 
the elements of the enhancement statute were 
satisfied i f that the other individuals shared 
[4,5] 18 The gang enhancement statute 
provides in part; 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense 
listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two 
or more persons is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for the offense as provided below, 
(b) "/n concert with two or more per-
sons'* as used in this section means the 
defendant and two or more other persons 
would be OTminaily liable for the offense as 
parties under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-*-208.1(l)(a) & (b) 
(1995) (emphasis added). Section 7&-2-202, 
the requisite mental state for murder. This 
means that the issue of the applicable burden of 
proof is squarely before us today. See infra f 9 
4. Lopes raises a senes of other claims. He ar-
gues that the statute interferes with his funda-
mental due process rights because it denies him 
his nght to a preliminary hearing, which article 
I. section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees. 
In the alternative, he argues that the statute 
identifies additional elements of the underlying 
offense that the State must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to the same trier of fact who 
decided guilt on the predicate crime. And final-
ly* Lopes argues on appeal that the statute vio-
lates the federal Due Process Clause because it is 
vague and overly broad and that it violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the uniform operation of laws 
provision of the Utah Constitution. Because we 
decide this case based on the fundamental rights 
arguments in the text, we do not need to address 
these additional constitutional challenges. 
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referred to in section 76-3-203.1(1 Kb), states 
that a person who acts "with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense," 
and "either directly commits the offense, [or) 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such con-
duct." Id § 76-2-202. In summary, section 
76-3-203.1(1 )(a) requires that ail three actors 
must (i) have possessed a mental state suffi-
cient to commit the same underlying offense 
and (ii) have directly committed the underly-
ing offense or solicited, requested, command-
ed, encouraged, or intentionally aided one of 
the other two actors to engage in conduct 
constituting the underlying offense. At a 
minimum, under the statute, the State must 
prove that all three actors are guilty of "aid-
ing and abetting." This was the effective 
holding of our decisions in State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum r) and 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). 
In Labrum /, we made it clear that "in 
concert" under the gang enhancement stat-
ute means that the defendant acted with at 
least two other people and "that those other 
persons must also be liable for the underly-
ing offense." Id at 940; see also California 
v. Zermena, 61 Cal.App.4th 623, 628, 71 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 672 (Cal.CtApp.1998) (holding that 
statute imposing enhanced sentence upon 
showing of "pattern of criminal gang activity" 
required State to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at least one other actor was guilty 
of "aiding and abetting" defendant). 
19 This leads us to the burden of proof 
issue. In Labrum /, we did not address the 
burden of proof by which the State must 
prove the (4in concert" element of the gang 
enhancement statute, but the court of ap-
peals did address that question In a subse-
quent appeaL In Labrum /, we stated that 
before imposing the gang enhancement, the 
statute required uthe sentencing judge [to] 
make discrete . . . findings" that are 'Indis-
pensable to the gang enhancement statute 
because they establish the legal basis that 
justifies imposition of the prescribed penal-
ty." Labrum I 925 P.2d at 940. We re-
S. The court of appeals decided Labrum II after 
oral argument in the present case. Pursuant to 
rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
manded Labrum I for further proceedings 
because "no specific finding was entered with 
respect to the complicity of the other two 
persons who accompanied Labrum.'' Id at 
941. On remand, the trial court made factual 
findings regarding the other two actors' par-
ticipation and then enhanced Labrums sen-
tence. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120. 
121 (Utah Ct.App.1998) rLabrum ID. 
Labrum again appealed. 
110 Before the court of appeals, Labrum 
argued that the sentencing court's findings 
were legally insufficient to fix accomplice lia-
bility. Labrum premised his argument on 
both the language of the statute and due 
process. The court of appeals reversed the 
enhancement on grounds that the findings 
were insufficient It did not address the 
constitutional question; instead, it held: 
Under this statute, it is not enough that 
others were present when the crime was 
committed. Rather, the quality of their 
involvement must rise to the level of par-
ticipation described in section 76-2-202, 
Id at 124. The court of appeals then went 
on to say that all three actors "must possess 
a sufficiently culpable mental state, and the 
prosecution must prove the foregoing beyond 
a reasonable doubt" Id (emphasis added). 
Because the court of appeals appeared to 
rely on statutory interpretation to fix the 
burden of proof, it had no occasion to address 
Labrum's constitutional challenges.3 
[6] 111 Today, Lopes presents to this 
court a challenge to the gang enhancement 
statute that is essentially identical to the one 
passed upon by the court of appeals in Lab-
rum II. He contends that the State must 
prove all the elements of accomplice liability, 
including the mental state, beyond a reason-
able doubt We agree with Lopes and con-
clude that the statutory "enhancement" re-
quires proof of the other actor's criminal 
culpability, and that the State must prove 
their criminal culpability beyond a reason-
able doubt This conclusion finds support in 
dure, Lopes notified this court of the Labrum 11 
decision. 
STATE v 
Cite as 980 P 2d 
our decision in State v. Angits, 531 P.2d 992 
(Utah 1978). 
112 In Angus, the defendant was charged 
with aggravated assault, and the State 
sought a firearm enhancement. The defen-
dant argued that the firearm enhancement 
statute created a separate offense that the 
State had to plead as a separate crime, not as 
an enhancement. This court disagreed. See 
id at 994. In rejecting the claim of a sepa-
rate crime that had to be separately charged, 
we said: "When the matter is looked at 
correctly and realistically, it is seen that 
there is but one criminal act charged, but 
describing it accurately brings it within the 
higher penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an 
aggravated assault which was committed 
with a firearm." Ji it 994 (footnote omit-
ted). Angus acknowledged that the legisla-
ture has the prerogative "to prescribe the 
punishment for crimes" and thereby may 
"increase the degree of crime." Id. We said 
that the legislature, by enacting the firearm 
enhancement, had increased the degree of 
the crime by establishing a separate set of 
elements that, if proven, warranted a higher 
punishment Importantly for present pur-
poses, we concluded in Angus that while the 
State did not need to separately charge the 
enhancement as a crime, it did need to prove 
each element, including the defendant's use 
of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt be-
cause the crime was increased as to degree 
by the presence of the firearm See id, at 
f 13 Returning to the present case, as both 
a state and federal constitutional matter, we 
conclude that due process requires that the 
prosecution prove every element of the 
charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt 
See Utah Const art I, § 7; U.S. Const 
amend. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrem* 
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process 
mandates that the prosecution prove every 
element of the charged crimes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"); State v. Smenson> 838 P.2d 
1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State 
has burden of proving all elements of a 
crime); State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 
1981) ("A fundamental precept of our crimi-
nal la1* MI that (lie state must prove all 
. LOPES Utah 195 
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elements of a mrw bevond i m'i.snnaHp 
doubt."). 
114 Furthermore, and independently, as a 
statutory matter, the Code requires that the 
State prove each element of the charged 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (requiring that 
each "element of the offense charged" be 
"proved beyond a reasonable doubt," includ-
ing "[t]he conduct, attendant circumstances, 
and [t]he culpable mental state required."). 
115 When the legislature passed the gang 
enhancement provision, it acted just as it did 
when it passed the firearm enhancement pro-
vision: it mandated imposition of an enhance-
ment only upon proof of elements over and 
above those required for the cnme of lesser 
consequence. In essence, it created a specif-
ic new crime or a crime of a higher degree. 
As such, each of the elements must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, 
they were not. Therefore, we find the trial 
courts imposition of the ftang enhancement to 
have been in error. 
Il i' I 116 Finally, * e turn to Lupes s as-
sertion that the gang enhancement statute 
interferes with his right to a jury trial. He 
argues that since the statute creates a sepa-
rate and new offense, each element must be 
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, 
not the trial judge. We agree. The Utah 
Constitution provides u(i]n criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall have the right . . . to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury." Utah Const art I, § 12. In criminal 
jury trials, questions of fact and the weight 
of evidence are to be decided by the jury, 
absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-10 (1995); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 
589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the sole 
and exclusive province of the jury to deter-
mine the facts in all criminal cases, whether 
the evidence offered by the state is weak or 
strong, is in conflict or is not controverted."). 
117 The gang enhancement statute, sec 
tion 76-3-203.1(5X0, provides: 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the 
jury shall decide whether to impose the 
enhanced penalty under this section. The 
imposition of the penalty is contingent 
upon a finding by the sentencing judge 
that this section is applicable. In conjunc-
non with sentencing the court shall enter 
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written findings of fact concerning the ap-
plicability of this section. 
This section of the enhancement statute di-
rects the judge to become the fact finder, 
expressly taking that power away from the 
jury. In this case, the judge followed the 
statute and became the fact finder. Even 
though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying 
offense, his plea did not establish the requi-
site mental state of the other actors, as is 
necessary to support imposition of the gang 
enhancement. His plea, then, did not estab-
lish all of the elements of the enhancement 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial 
judge supplemented the plea by making the 
factual finding that the elements of the gang 
enhancement were established, and imple-
mented the enhancement This clearly vio-
lated article I, section 12 of the Utah Consti-
tution because, absent waiver, only a jury has 
the ability to determine when elements of a 
crime are established beyond a reasonable 
doubt Therefore, we find subsection (5)(c) 
of § 76-3-203.1 of the Code unconstitutional. 
[8,9] 118 Having held subsection (5X0 
unconstitutional we now determine if the 
remainder of the gang enhancement statute 
can remain in effect The general rule is 
uthat statutes, where possible, are to be con-
strued so as to sustain their constitutionality. 
Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might 
be saved by severing the part that is uncon-
stitutional, such should *be done.1* Celebrity 
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This bask 
rule applies to criminal and civil statutes 
equally. See State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 
69, 428 P.2d 13, 15 (1967) (court severed 
unconstitutional section of criminal statute); 
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct 
App.1990) (holding that basic rule [of sever-
6. Section 76-1-108 states: "If any provision of 
this act, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this act shall not be affected there* 
by." Although we have never interpreted this 
provision in the past, we now find that the only 
purpose of this section is to preserve the entire 
criminal code in case any one provision is de-
clared unconstitutional. On its face, it does not 
give any direction in this circumstance, where 
we are trying to determine the severability of one 
subsection from a larger section. 
ing unconstitutional provision] applies to the 
construction of criminal statutes). 
[10-121 119 To determine if a statute is 
severable from its unconstitutional subsec-
tion, we look to legislative intent. If the 
intent is not expressly stated, we then turn 
to the statute itself, and examine the remain-
ing constitutional portion of the statute in 
relation to the stricken portion. If the re-
mainder of the statute is operable and still 
furthers the intended legislative purpose, the 
statute will be allowed to stand. See Union 
Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429, 
211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949), quoted in Steuvrt v. 
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n* 885 P.2d 759. 779-
80 (Utah 1994). 
[13] 120 The criminal code contains a 
separability clause, but it does not aid us in 
this situation.6 Furthermore, since there is 
no express intent on the severability question 
in the gang enhancement statute, we exam-
ine the statute itself to determine if severing 
section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) will destroy the pur-
pose of the statute. A close reading of 76-3-
203.1 indicates that severing subsection (5)(c) 
will not make the objective of the statute 
unconstitutional.7 The statute imposes high-
er penalties if a person commits certain of-
fenses "in concert with two or more persons.'* 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1X1995). It 
makes no difference in the application of the 
statute or the satisfaction of its purposes if 
the trial judge is the fact finder or if the 
questions of fact are left to the jury. We 
therefore find the remaining portion of the 
gang enhancement statute constitutional. 
121 We address the proper course of fur-
ther proceedings in this case. We reverse 
and remand for a new trial on the gang 
enhancement charge. Our remand does not 
7. Section 76-3-203.2 of the Utah Code, which 
imposes enhanced penalties for the use of dan-
gerous weapons in offenses committed on school 
premises, is almost identical in structure to the 
gang enhancement statute. A key difference is 
that section 76-3-203.2 does not include a sec-
tion making the judge the fact finder in a particu-
lar case. It seems clear that holding subsection 
(5Mc) of the gang enhancement statute invalid as 
unconstitutional will not frustrate the legislative 
purpose of the statute, as section 76-3-203 2 
operates without making the trial judge the fact 
finder. 
STATE v 
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nlace the defendant in double jeopardy, be-
muse the failure to prove an essential ele-
ment of the gang enhancement charge was 
trial error.'* See State v. Higginbotham* 
917 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Utah 1996) (decision 
was reversed and remanded due to failure to 
prove an essential element of the charge). It 
was not the fault of the prosecution that all 
elements of the gang enhancement statute 
were not satisfied. Until this decision, no 
one had notice that the enhancement statute 
requires proof of all elements beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, or that this determination 
could not be made by a judge absent a 
waiver of the right to a jury trial. There-
fore, the State should not be denied the right 
to a fair adjudication because of double jeop-
ardy. See State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 
347 (Utah 1980) ('The state and the accused 
share the right to a fair, error-free determi-
nation of the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused, and the double jeopardy clause may 
not deny either side that right"). 
122 We hold that the gang* enhancement 
statute creates a new and separate offense 
and, therefore, the Code requires each ele-
ment of this crime be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt Since the elements of the 
crime were not established against Lopes, 
either by his plea or by a jury trial, he was 
deprived of his due process rights as guaran-
teed by the federal and Utah constitutions. 
Furthermore, subsection (5Xc) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is found to violate a defen-
dants right to a jury trial as established in 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial on the 
section 76-3-203.1 charge 
123 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM 
and Justice STEWART concur in Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, dissenting: 
124 I dissent In my opinion, the gang 
enhancement statute is simply a sentencing 
statute. It does not create a separate of-
fense with a separate penalty, nor does it add 
elements to the underlying offense. Rather, 
it merely enhances the minimum sentence for 
the underlying offense once the accused has 
been found guilty of that offense; the maxi-
mum sentence remains the same regardless 
LOPES Utah 197 
191 (L'uh 1999) 
of whether the enhancement applies. In 
fact, the statute specifically states, "This sec-
tion does not create any separate offense but 
provides an enhanced penalty for the pri-
mary .offense." I Jtah Code Ann § 76-;*-
203.1(5Ka)(1995). 
125 As a general principle, the legislature 
has broad authority to define crimes and 
corresponding punishments, and its decision 
in this regard should not be proscribed un-
less it offends some fundamental principle of 
justice. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 
(1986); see also State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992. 
994-95 (Utah 1978) ("It is the prerogative of 
the legislature to prescribe the punishment 
for crimes."). With respect to Utah's fire-
arm and gang enhancement statutes, this 
court has recognized and upheld the legisla-
ture's authority to require a trial judge to 
enhance a defendant's statutory minimum 
sentence if certain requirements are met 
during the sentencing phase. See, e.g., State 
v. Alvarez, 872 ?2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994) 
(affirming trial court's imposition of en-
hanced minimum sentence under section 76-
3-203.1 upon court's finding that defendant 
committed underlying offense "in concert" 
with others); Stats v. Deli 861 P.2d 431, 
434-35 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial court's 
imposition of enhanced minimum sentence 
under section 76-3-203 for use of firearm 
during commission of offense); Angus, 581 
P.2d at 996 (same). 
126 Notably, with respect to the firearm 
enhancement statute, we have consistently 
held that the statute does not create a sepa-
rate, additional penalty for the underlying 
offense; it merely "enhances" the minimum 
sentence. For example, in Angus, after the 
defendant had been convicted of aggravated 
assault the trial court imposed an enhanced 
minimum sentence pursuant to the firearm 
enhancement statute. See 581 P.2d at 993. 
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the 
statute created a separate offense which 
must be charged separately, we stated: 
The punishment for a crime is not and 
has never been considered a part of the 
pleading charging a crime— After con-
viction, the penalty to be imposed is an 
entirely separate proposition to be deter-
mined by the court as a matter of law on 
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the basis of the penalty prescribed by the 
statutes. 
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995. 
127 More recently, in Deli we affirmed a 
firearm enhancement imposed after the de-
fendant was convicted of a number of crimes, 
including murder. Once again, we empha-
sized that the enhancement penalties of the 
firearm enhancement statute are not sepa-
rate sentences; instead, "the legislature in-
tended the penalty for using a firearm in the 
commission of a felony to simply increase' or 
'enhance' the original sentence imposed, not 
to stand alone as a separate sentence." Deli 
861 P.2d at 434. 
128 In Alvarez, we upheld an enhanced 
penalty imposed pursuant to the gang en-
hancement statute, see 872 P.2d at 461-62; 
however, in that case we did not address 
whether section 76-3-203.1 creates a sepa-
rate offense with a separate penalty. I 
would hold that it does not Before a defen-
dant is subject to an enhanced penalty under 
either the firearm or the gang enhancement 
statute, the defendant first must be convicted 
of an underlying offense,1 Thereafter, the 
sentencing judge must impose an 'Indetermi-
nate" sentence prescribed by statute.2 While 
the judge ordinarily has the power to sus-
pend the defendant's sentence,3 under the 
firearm and gang enhancement statutes the 
judge must enhance the minimum sentence 
for the underlying offense if certain require-
ments art met Thus, the gang enhance-
ment statute operates in exactly the same 
1. The underlying offenses are enumerated in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(4) and include 
crimes such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and 
robbery. 
2. Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
scheme, the sentencing judge must impose a 
sentence and judgment of imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term "of not less than the mini-
mum and not to exceed the maximum term pro-
vided by law for the particular crime/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-4(2). Unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, every sentence "shall 
continue until the maximum period has been 
reached unless sooner terminated or commuted 
by authority of the Board of Pardons and Pa-
role." Id. § 77-18-4(3); see also Padtlla v. 
Board of Pardons. 947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) 
("By its very term, the indeterminate' sentence 
shall continue until the maximum period expires 
manner as the firearm enhancement stat-
ute—that is, it merely increases the mini-
mum sentence which the legislature has pre-
scribed for the underlying offense. It does 
not affect the maximum sentence. 
129 The majority opinion holds that the 
"in concert'* requirement defined in section 
76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense be-
cause it combines a separate mens rea—i.e., 
"in concert" mental culpability—with a crimi-
nal act This reasoning is flawed. While a 
defendant may be charged with a crime and 
held accountable as an accomplice under sec-
tion 76-2-202/ the mere fact that a statute 
may operate to impose criminal liability does 
not preclude its use as a sentencing factor, so 
long as its use in sentencing does not carry a 
separate or additional penalty. Like the fire-
arm enhancement statute, the gang enhance-
ment statute does not impose an additional 
or separate penalty upon the judge's finding 
that the defendant would be criminally liable 
under that statute; it simply enhances the 
minimum sentence. 
130 The mere fact that the statute re-
quires the judge to make a certain finding 
before imposing a sentence does not make 
that finding an additional element of the 
predicate offense. For instance, in connec-
tion with sentencing, a judge is called upon to 
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, 
and those factors do not thereby become 
additional elements of the underlying of-
fense: 
unless the Board, in its discretion, terminates or 
commutes the punishment or pardons the offend-
er".). Under section 77-27-9(l)(b) (Supp 1998). 
the Board of Pardons and Parole may release an 
offender before the minimum term has been 
served if mitigating circumstances justify the re-
lease. 
3. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998). 
4. See State v. Cornish, 560 P 2d It 34, 1136 (Utah 
1977) (explaining that accomplice is one who 
participates in crime in such a way that he could 
be charged with same offense as the principal 
defendant); State v. Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 
P2d 430. 431 (1971) (concluding that defendant 
who drove co-defendant to store that was 
robbed, waited in car with engine running, and 
then drove co-defendant to another car one block 
away after co-defendant had allegedly killed 
store owner was "principal"). 
/ 
STATE v 
Cite as 980 P2d 
[n all cases where an indeterminate sen-
tence is imposed, the judge imposing the 
sentence may . . . mail to the [Board of 
Pardons and Parole] . . . any information 
he may have regarding the character of 
the offender or any mitigating or aggrava-
ting circumstances connected with the of-
fense for which the offender has been con-
victed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5)(a) (Supp. 
1998); see also ia\ § 76-3-201(6)(a) (Supp. 
1998) ("If a statute under which the defen-
dant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be im-
posed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of 
the crime."); id § 76-3-201(6)(c) (Supp. 
1998) ("In determining whether there are 
circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consid-
er statements in aggravation or mitiga-
tion submitted by the prosecution or the 
defendant, and any further evidence intro-
duced at the sentencing hearing/'). 
If III Furthermore, in considering the perti-
nent sentencing factors, judges sometimes 
must take into account the defendant's men-
tal state. For example, the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration requires judges to 
"[cjonsider [the following] aggravating cir-
cumstances only if they are not an element of 
the offense 5. Offense was character-
ized by extreme cruelty or depravity— I 
Offender's attitude is not conducive to super-
vision in a less restrictive setting." Utah 
Code of Judicial Admin, app. C, at 1297 
(1998); accord id. app. D, at 1368 (authoris-
ing presentence investigator to consider 
whether crime was characterized by extreme 
cruelty or depravity); id at 1371 (same). 
Thus, weighing the defendants state of mind 
is well within the realm of a sentencing 
judge's authority. 
U32 Moreover, acting with" "in concert* 
mental culpability is not identified as an ele-
ment of any of the enumerated felonies in the 
gang enhancement statute. Set Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(4). In fact, under the 
statute, a sentencing judge does not even 
inquire into the defendant's mental state un-
til after the defendant has been duly convict-
ed of an enumerated felony. 
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<!33 The United States Supreme Court's 
decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania 477 
U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 
(1986), is instructive. That case involved a 
constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania 
sentencing statute which provides that any-
one convicted of certain enumerated felonies 
is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 
of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing 
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant "visibly possessed 
a firearm" during the commission of the of-
fense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81, 106 S.Ct. 
2411. Recognizing that states have broad 
authority to define crimes and prescribe pen-
alties, the Court observed that 
the Pennsylvania Legislature has express-
ly provided that visible possession of a 
firearm is not an element of the crimes 
enumerated in the mandatory sentencing 
statute . . . but instead is a sentencing 
factor that comes into play only after the 
defendant has been found guilty of one of 
those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id at 85-86,106 S.Ct 2411. 
134 In upholding the constitutionality of 
the Pennsylvania statute, the McMillan 
Court reasoned that (1) the enhancement 
implied no presumption of guilt, nor was the 
prosecution relieved of its burden of proving 
the defendant guilty of an enumerated of-
fense, see id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 2411; (2) the 
enhancement did not extend the period of 
incarceration beyond the terms provided for 
any of the enumerated felonies to which it 
applied, nor did it create a separate offense 
calling for a separate penalty, but rather 
merely limited the trial court's sentencing 
discretion in selecting a penalty within the 
range already available to it, see id at 87-88, 
106 S.Ct 2411; (3) "[t]he statute [gave] no 
impression of having been tailored to permit 
the visible possession finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive of-
fense," i.e., the argument that the enhance-
ment was really an element of the offense 
lacked even superficial appeal because it did 
not expose the defendant to greater or addi-
tional punishment see id at 88, 106 S.Ct 
2411; and (4) the Pennsylvania legislature 
"did not change the definition of any existing 
offense [but] simply took one factor that has 
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always been considered by sentencing courts 
to bear on punishment—the instrumentality 
used in committing a violent felony—and dic-
tated the precise weight to be given that 
factor." Id. at 39-90, 106 S.Ct. 2411. 
In conclusion, the Court stated: 
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard 
evidence and found facts without any pre-
scribed burden of proof at all. 
Sentencing courts necessarily consider 
the circumstances of an offense in selecting 
the appropriate punishment, and we have 
consistently approved sentencing schemes 
that mandate consideration of facts related 
to the crime without suggesting that those 
facts must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Id. at 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 2411 (citations omit-
ted). 
135 Under McMillan's reasoning, the 
gang enhancement statute at hand is clearly 
constitutional. First, the Utah Legislature 
expressly chose to make group criminal ac-
tivity a sentencing factor rather than a sepa-
rate offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(5Xa) ('This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense."). This is 
clear not only from the language of the stat-
ute, but also because the statute does not 
impose an additional, separate penalty to the 
penalty for the underlying offense. Second, 
the statute comes into play only after the 
defendant has been duly convicted of violat-
ing one of the enumerated offenses in section 
76-3-203.1(4). The statute implies no pre-
sumption of guilt, and the prosecution is not 
relieved of its burden of proving each ele-
ment of an enumerated felony. Third, the 
statute does not expose the defendant to a 
greater maximum term; it merely increases 
the minimum sentence prescribed by statute 
for the underlying offense. Thus, the statute 
in no way operates as "a tail which wags the 
dog of the substantive offense."9 McMillan, 
3. While Lopes does not question the reasoning 
upholding the Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, 
he asks this court to invalidate the gang en-
hancement statute, which actually makes it more 
difficult for a judge to enhance a defendant's sen-
tence. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the sen-
tencing judge was merely required to make a 
477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Fourth, even 
if the commission of an offense uin concert 
with two or more persons" has not tradition-
ally been a sentencing factor, that fact alone 
should not limit the legislature's authority to 
prescribe an enhanced penalty for such con-
duct. If the legislature has the authority to 
determine that committing a crime while visi-
bly possessing a firearm is a factor that 
should be given precise weight during sen-
tencing, it should also have the authority to 
determine that committing a crime "in con-
cert with two or more persons" justifies im-
position of an enhanced minimum sentence if 
certain requirements are met.5 
136 Finally, I disagree with the majority's 
description of the claimed constitutional right 
allegedly impinged upon by the gang en-
hancement statute. The majority contends 
that because the statute enhances the mini-
mum sentence on the basis of findings con-
cerning the defendant's mental culpability, 
those findings somehow become additional 
elements of a separate crime. As already 
indicated, I disagree with this premise. 
More disturbing, however, is that from this, 
the majority extrapolates that under both the 
state and the federal due process clauses, the 
statute violates a criminal defendant's funda-
mental right to be presumed innocent until 
each element of the offense is proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt While criminal defen-
dants certainly have a right to such a pre-
sumption of innocence, the majority identifies 
no authority that this right is infringed when 
a sentencing judge makes findings relevant 
to sentencing without the state having to 
prove those findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt Without any articulated constitution-
al basis, the majority simply states that this 
is required. 
137 In sum, because the gang enhance-
ment statute creates neither a separate 
crime with a separate penalty nor an addi-
tional element to an underlying offense, I 
factual finding diat the defendant visibly pos-
sessed a firearm. Under the gang enhancement 
statute, the sentencing judge must make a factual 
finding and must further determine that the de-
fendant possessed the mental state required for 
liability as an accomplice to the underlying of-
fense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
STATE v. CALL 
Cittas9*0 ?2d 201 (Utah 1999) 
U'ah 
would hold that Lopes was not denied any 
fundamental rights. I would affirm. 
<!38 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Jus-
tice RUSSON'S dissenting opinion. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Leslie J. CALL, Defendant and Appellant 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 30, 1999. 
The District Court, Salt Lake Division, 
Frank G. Noel, J., revoked probationer's pro-
bation for violation occurring after probation 
had been extended Probationer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals certified case. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that (1) 
probation was properly extended by proba-
tioner's agreement to one-year extension and 
waiver of personal appearance well before 
expiration date, and (2) waiver was knowing-
ly, voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law e»982.7 
To extend probationary period beyond 
its original term, State must take definitive 
action to extend term before the expiration 
date, and probationer must be given notice of 
that intent U.C.A.1953,7M&-l(12)(a)(i). 
2. Criminal Law <S»982.T 
Probation IVM property extended by 
probationer's agreement to one-year exten-
sion and waiver of personal appearance on 
extension well before expiration date, even 
though State did not initiate extension prr> 
1- The parties disagree on the date when Call's 
probation began. Call asserts that it began on 
Apnl 3, 1992, the day the court orally sentenced 
him. The State, however, relies on Stale v. 
ceedings prior to that date, as probationer 
had actual notice that his term of probation 
would not expire <it conclusion of statutory 
36-month period. FCA1953, 77-18-
l(12)(a)(i). 
i, < nminal Law G>982.7 
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on 
issue of whether his probation should be 
extended by signing waiver form that in-
formed him of his right to appear and to be 
represented by counsel, as defendant was 
competent, read from, able to read form, and 
had reasonable understanding of proceed-
ings. U.C.AJ953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). 
Jan Graham, Att'y ben., Barnard N \Ud 
sen, Asst Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
Joan C. Watt, Scoti i 
City, for defendant 
\ llhinia, *iaJt I *ike 
HOWE, Chief Justice: 
11 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district 
court order revoking his probation and or-
dering him to serve his sentence of two con-
current prison terms. However, after oral 
argument, but before rendering a decision, 
the court of appeals certified it to us pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule 
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
BACKGROUND 
I * On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded 
guilty to one count of burglary and one count 
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third 
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced 
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to 
five years in prison but then suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation for a 
period of three years. Although the court 
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did 
not enter the written judgment and sentence 
until April 8,1992.1 
Anderson, 797 P 2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App 1990), to 
argue that Call's probationary penod did not 
begin until April 8, 1992, the day the court 
signed and entered the written judgment. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CAMERON T. LOPES, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW & ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY 
TRIAL ON CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Hon. Dennis M. Fuchs 
WHEREAS the above-styled case came on for hearing on 29 November 1999 at 8:30 
a.m., on the defendant's motion to be afforded a jury trial on the criminal homicide charge; the 
defendant being present and represented by his attorney, Mr. Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender's Association; the state being represented by its attorney, Mr. Rodwicke Ybarra, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County; the court having previously read the defendant's 
memorandum and the transcript of the change of plea hearing occurring on 7 August 1996; the 
court having received and carefully considered the arguments of the parties; and otherwise being 
fully informed in the premises; 
NOW THEREFORE, the court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant entered separate pleas to the criminal homicide charge, to the gang 
enhancement and to the gun enhancement at the change of plea hearing on 7 August 1996. 
2. The defendant's conditional Sery plea was only as to the gang enhancement. 
riLcv ui* iv • * www.. 
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CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Page 2 
3. During the plea colloquy on 7 August 1999, Judge Peuler made it very 
understandable to the defendant that one possible effect of a successful appeal of her ruling on 
the constitutionality of the gang enhancement would be that he might not be able to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the criminal homicide charge, but rather only have his sentence adjusted. 
4. The remand from the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Lopes, ordered only that the 
defendant be allowed "a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." 
5. Upon remand, the state moved to dismiss the gang enhancement consistent with 
its stated agreement at the change of plea hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant was informed prior to his entry of plea to the murder charge and 
gun enhancement of the possible consequence that should he prevail on his appeal of the 
consitutionality of the gang enhancement he might not be entitled to withdraw his plea to the 
murder charge but only have his sentence modified. 
2. In accordance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant is only 
entitled to a trial on the §76-3-203.1 (gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide 
charge with gun enhancement. 
ORDER 
1. Based upon the State's motion, the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1, is hereby 
ordered dismissed 
2. The defendant's sentence shall be modified to delete that portion attributable to 
the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1. 
3. The defendant's motion for a trial on the criminal homicide, murder charge is 
hereby denied. 
°0344 
ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY TRIAL ON 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Page 3 
DATED this /J day of • r/fa~CS^, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
' **& '^r ~<^£ -^-^-
DENNIS M. FUCHS, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, Re: Defendant's 
Motion To Be Afforded A Jury Trial On Criminal Homicide Charge was delivered to Michael A. 
Peterson, Attorney for Defendant CAMERON T. LOPES, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 on the vj^day of January, 2000. 
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it's a foregone conclusion win on "as -a-party". You 
cannot have the two coincide. It's a logical 
impossibility. 
THE COURT: The Court is going to deny your 
motion for the following reasons. 
One, I think during the plea colloquy -- I 
think that Judge Peuler made it very understandable to 
Mr. Lopes -- if I mispronounce that, I apologize --
that his appeal of the gang enhancement could be 
overturned but, under the worst case scenario, it 
wouldn't affect his pleas on the other charges, being 
the homicide and being the gun enhancement. 
And, in fact, I think she was very specific. 
Again, at your request Mr. Peterson. In reading 
the -- the transcript, that she took a plea to each 
separately. 
I don't think there's any question but it 
was a knowing and intelligent plea entered to the 
homicide. There was a knowing, intelligent plea to 
the gun enhancement. And there was a Serv plea 
entered in regard to the gang enhancement. 
In reading the case from the Supreme Court 
in reversing and remanding, the argument was he had to 
be tried on the new enhancement or on the enhancement. 
I agree with you that if the State agreed to go 
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forward on the enhancement, it would probably have to 
be a trial on more than the one charge. However, I 
think the State is willing to and they have been --
they have dismissed the enhancement. They don't plan 
on pursuing the enhancement, and I don't think there 
is anything in the order of the Supreme Court that 
requires Mr. Lopes to be allowed to withdraw all of 
the pleas and go back to trial on the homicide either. 
If that was their intent, they will have to 
make it a lot more clear than they did in their 
decision in this case. You will have to go back up 
there. 
So, I think that his plea was knowing and 
voluntary. 
| I am not saying it's not timely. I'm not 
| buying that argument. I think ha has been back --as 
soon as tha decision was rendered, he has been back in 
regards to tha gang anhancamant. 
So, for those reasons, I am denying your 
motion. I think his plea was knowingly and 
-intelligently made. I don't think tha Supreme Court 
decision requires that ha be given a new trial on all 
charges. I think tha State is dismissing the gang 
enhancement or has dismissed the gang enhancement and 
I think tha only thing Mr. Lopes is entitled to is --
o. r, 9 A 7 
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I don't even know if Judge Peuler resentenced him or 
not. 
MR. YBARRA: I don't believe she has. 
THE COURT: I think he might be entitled to a 
modification to the sentence accordingly striking the 
gang enhancement. And I would do that unless you 
would request a hearing in regards to sentencing. 
Again, the Court would just go ahead and issue a 
modified commitment striking the consecutive gang 
enhancement• 
And also in regard to the party to the , 
offense, the Supreme Court has not ruled the language 
in criminal statutes which provide for one to be 
guilty to -- as a party to the offense, they have not 
said that is unconstitutional and, in fact, that has 
been challenged and held many times. 
Do you have need for any clarification? 
MR. PETERSON: Judge, we don't -- we don't 
need a separate hearing for additional sentencing. We 
would, however, need a new commitment order. 
THE COURT: We will give a new commitment 
striking the consecutive gang enhancement language. 
MR. PETERSON: I want to make crystal clear 
that the State has, in fact, dismissed the gang 
enhancement provisions on Mr. Lopes. 
n ft 9 A Q 
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August 7, 1996 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The matter before the Court is State 
of Utah versus Cameron Lopes. There are two case numbers, 
however, Case Nos. 961900816 and 0885. I'll indicate for 
the record that both counsel are present, all three counsel 
are present, excuse me, and Mr. Lopes 
morning. 
What's anticipated then Mr. 
is also present this 
Peterson? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we' 11 have a 
plea in the case ending 0885. The motion by the 
dismiss 0816, pending before you, 
to dismiss two cases before Judge 
961900546,.this Friday. 
THE COURT: Do you need 
numbers, Kathy? 
KATHY: No. 







MR. YBARRA: That is the State 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
then. First of all, Mr. Peterson 
know who is going to proceed, but 























1 MR. PETERSON: Yes, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: All right. And have either one or 
3 both of you had an opportunity to go over the contents of 
4 that statement with Mr. Lopes in a manner that you believe 
5 is sufficient for him to understand the contents of that 
6 statement? 
7 MR. PETERSON: Yes, I have, Judge. 
8 THE COURT: And do you also believe, based upon 
9 your conversations with Mr. Lopes, that he understands his 
10 constitutional rights? 
11 MR. PETERSON: I do-
12 THE COURT: Mr. Lopes, let me ask you some 
13 questions. First of all, is your correct name Cameron 
14 Lopes? 
15 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: And do you have a middle name, Mr. 
17 Lopes? 
18 MR. LOPES: Thomas. 
19 THE COURT: Thomas? 
20 MR. LOPES: Yup, Yes. 
21 THE COURT: What is your date of birth, Mr, 
22 Lopes? 
23 MR. LOPES: 4/29/76. 
24 J THE COURT: Mr. Lopes, the statement of defendant 



























also in front of you at this 






time. Did you 
someone read it 
Tell me what happened. 
have an 
to you? 
Did you read 
it or did someone read it to you or with you? 
MR. LOPES: My lawyer read it with me. 
THE COURT: All right. Did he read it to you so 
that you didn't have to read it yourself? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you understand what 
he read to you? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did you have a sufficient opportunity 
to ask him any questions about anything that was in that 
statement? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: And did he answer all of your 
questions for you? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. So, as you stand before 
me now, in looking at the statement of defendant's that's 
in front of you, you can tell me that you understand 
everything that's in there. 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 







































All right. Are you presently under 
alcohol or drugs, Mr. Lopes? 
No. 
When's the last time you had any 
MR. LOPES: 
THE COURT: 
while you've been in 
MR. LOPES: 
THE COURT: 
A long time. 
Not within the past several days 
custody? 
No. 
All right. When is the last time you 
had a controlled substance, controlled substance either 














Not within the last days. 
How long have you been in custody? 
Six months. 
Have you had any controlled 
ve been in custody? 
No. 
Not even prescriptive medication? 
No. 
All right. And are you thinking 
Yes. 







































these proceedings are fc 
Yeah/ yes. 
And do you understand 
f defendant that 















THE COURT: Are you going to sign it voluntarily 
today? Is that a decision that you have made on your own? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right* You may go ahead and sign 
it at this time and I'll receive it. Are you right handed 
or left handed, Mr. Lopes? 
MR. LOPES: Right. 
MR. YBARRA: Mike, did I already sign that? 
MR. PETERSON: Yes, this is the one we went over 
last time. 
THE COURT: And I'll indicate that Mr. Lopes has 
signed the document in open Court. 
Mr. Peterson/ may I have a factual basis for the 
plea? 
MR. PETERSON: Yes, your Honor. Judge, in terms 
of the elements, in Salt Lake County, Mr. Lopes will be 
pleading guilty to acting as a party to an offense and 
under circumstances evidencing an depraved indifference to 
5 
human life, he engaged in conduct which created a great 
risk of death to another and, in fact, said conduct did 
cause the death of Joey Mierra. 
Factually, at 918 South Navajo Street in Salt 
Lake County, on February 22, 1996, Mr. Lopes was present on 
the porch of a house at roughly six in the morning. He was 
there with at least one other companion by the name of 
Miguel Florez and at that time Miguel Florez used a shotgun 
to shoot and kill Joey Mierra. Mr. Lopes aided Mr. Florez 
in this shooting in that Mr. Lopes was present on the porch 
and was armed with a shotgun at that time Mr. Florez shot 
Mr. Mierra. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ybarra, do you wish to add 
anything to that factual basis? 
MR. YBARRA: Just simply to add that the defendant 
actually acted in concert with the, I believe, two other 
persons. That would be Colin Carter and Miguel Florez 
making a total of three people that were on the porch. And 
for the record, Mr. Carter has already plead guilty to this 
very offense. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Lopes, is that actually what you did? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll receive the 
statement of defendant at this time. 
6 
1 And Mr. Lopes, let me ask you some additional 
2 questions and these questions relate to your constitutional 
3 rights. And you've had a little opportunity to discuss 
4 them with your attorney, but I also want to make sure 
5 before I accept any plea from you that you understand them. 
6 If I say anything that you don't understand, will you let 
7 me know? 
8 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: First of all, you understand, do you 
10 not, that you have the right to proceed to trial; that 
11 you're not required to enter a guilty plea to this charge 
12 or any charge? Do you understand that? 
13 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: Do you understand that if you proceed 
15 to trial you're presumed to be innocent? What that means 
16 is that you cannot be convicted unless the State is able to 
17 prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of this 
18 defense. Do you understand that? 
19 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Specifically, let me go over with you 
21 the elements that the State would be required to prove. 
22 And let me just ask Mr. Ybarra, with regard to the elements 
23 would the State be proceeding on the depraved indifference 
24 to human life element or — 
25 MR. YBARRA: Were we to proceed to trial, your 
7 
Honor, we would proceed on all — 
THE COURT: All three. 
MR. YBARRA: — the alleged theories including 
the intentional. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
The elements then, Mr. Lopes, that the State 
would be required to prove if you were to proceed to trial 
would be as follows: That at 918 South Navajo in Salt 
Lake County, on or about— I can't read this, it's 
handwritten. Is it December 2? 
MR. YBARRA: February 22nd, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sorry, February 22, 1996, that you as 
- a party to the offense, did one of the following: 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Joey Mierra 
and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
caused the death of Joey Mierra and/or acting under 
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human 
life engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby caused the death of Joey Mierra. 
Do you understand all of those elements that the 
State would be required to prove? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
you would have the right to a jury trial and the only way 
8 
1 that you could be convicted is if all of the jurors agreed 
2 that the State had met this burden of proof? 
3 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Do you understand that at the time of 
5 trial that you would have the right to see the witnesses 
6 face to face who would testify against you and you'd have 
7 the right to have your attorney cross-examine them on your 
8 behalf? 
9 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Do you understand that you'd be 
11 allowed to present any evidence that you would like to have 
12 the jury receive at the time of trial including your own 
13 right to testify, if you chose to do that. Do you 
14 understand that? 
15 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Do you also understand that whether 
17 or not you testify is a voluntary choice that you could 
18 make and if you decided that you did not want to testify at 
19 the time of trial, no one could hold that against you or 
20 draw any negative conclusions from that fact. Do you 
21 understand that? 
22 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Do you also understand that if you 
24 were convicted following a jury trial that you would have 
25 the right to appeal that conviction to an appellate court? 
9 
1 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: All right. I understand that your 
3 attorney has discussed with you appealing a pretrial ruling 
4 that I have made and certainly my understanding is that 
5 this guilty plea today will not affect that right but by 
6 entering a guilty plea today you give up many other rights 
7 of appeal that you would otherwise have. Do you understand 
8 that? 
9 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Do you want me to clarify that or 
11 explain that any further to you irt terms of those rights? 
12 MR. LOPES: No. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Are you entering a guilty 
14 plea today because you are actually guilty of this offense? 
15 MR. LOPES: Yup, Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Do you understand that this offense 
17 is charged as a first degree felony. It carries with it 
18 certain maximum punishments that I would like to go over 
19 with you so that I can make sure that you understand them. 
20 First of all, a first degree felony is punishable by a 
21 maximum prison term of not less than five years and that 
22 could be up to life. That carries with it also a maximum 
23 fine of $10,000. This offense is not only a first degree 
24 felony but it carries with it certain enhancements. The 
25 first is a gang enhancement. What that does is it adds a 
10 
possible additional four years to the minimum five year 
prison term. So that what you would be looking at on the 
first degree felony with the gang enhancement would be a 
possible prison term of nine years up to life. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. LOPES: Yup, yes. 
THE COURT: It also carries with it a gun 
enhancement and what that does is add additional, can add 
additional time to your sentence. For a first degree 
felony which is in this case, the Court, as I read the 
statute is required, if I find that a gun was used or a 
facsimile of a gun, I'm required to add at least one year 
consecutive, that means this year is served after your 
first sentence, to the underlying sentence and I have the 
discretion to add an additional term of zero to five years. 
Does that make sense to you? 
MR. LOPES. Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Counsel, do you want to, either one of you want 
to clarify what I've said or explain it any better? 
MR. PETERSON: I don't believe so, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ybarra? 
MR. YBARRA: Simply to clarify the fact that the 
additional one year on the gun enhancements may be served 
concurrently with the four years on the gang enhancements. 
11 
1 Is that everyone's understanding? 
2 MR. PETERSON: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: The statute says if the trior of fact 
4 finds a dangerous weapon of facsimile or representation was 
5 used, the Court shall additional sentence the person 
6 convicted for a term of one year to one consecutively and 
7 not currently. 
8 MR. YBARRA: So, it's consecutive to the basic 
9 sentence. 
10 THE COURT: And the Court may additionally 
11 sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not 
12 to exceed five years to run consecutively and concurrently. 
13 And the way I understand that is that I have an option if I 
14 choose to do so to add a consecutive one year term to the 
15 underlying sentence or in the alternative I may add a zero 
16 to five term to the underlying sentence. 
17 MR. YBARRA: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: Is that consistent with your? 
19 MR. YBARRA: It is, your Honor. I think the 
20 point that I was trying to make is that the although the 
21 enhancements maybe required to be consecutive to the basic 
22 sentence of five to life, they may be concurrent with 
23 other. 
24 THE COURT: Oh, yes. 
25 MR. YBARRA: That was (inaudible). 
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1 THE COURT: I believe you're right about that and 
2 I also believe that it's a fair interpretation of both of 
3 these statutes that I've just referred to that they are not 
4 required to be imposed by the Court. In other words, I 
5 believe that those are both things that I can consider at 
6 the time of sentencing. 
7 MR. PETERSON: That's our position, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: And they may be added but that's 
9 discretionary. Does everybody concur with that? 
10 MR. PETERSON: We believe that to be true. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lopes, the purpose of 
12 my going through these with you though is so that you can 
13 understand the worse case scenario. So that you understand 
14 what the maximum penalty is that is possible under this 
15 plea agreement. Do you understand the maximum penalty that 
16 I've gone over with you? 
17 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that at 
19 the time of sentencing your attorneys or the attorney 
20 representing the State will probably make certain 
21 recommendations to me that they'd like to have me follow. 
22 Do you understand that I'm not required to follow those 
23 recommendations at the time of sentencing? 
24 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything in 
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1 return for this guilty plea other than the plea agreement 
2 that's part of the record today? 
3 MR. LOPES: No. 
4 THE COURT: Has anybody threatened or coerced you 
5 in any manner to get you to enter a guilty plea today? 
6 MR. LOPES: No. 
7 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your 
8 representation that you've received from your attorneys? 
9 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Now I understand that 
11 this plea today is in the nature of what we call a Ceri 
12 plea. 
13 MR. PETERSON: That's true, Judge. 
14 THE COURT: Have you gone over that kind of a 
15 plea agreement with your attorney, Mr. Lopes. 
16 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the record, I've 
17 explained to Mr. Lopes that we will be potentially 
18 appealing the Court's application of a minimum mandatory 
19 gang enhancement sentence in this case based on your 
20 previous legal ruling where we asked the Court to declare 
21 the gang enhancement statute unconstitutional. And Mr. 
22 Lopes understands we will be pursuing that appeal even 
23 after the time he is sentenced in this case. 
24 Is that true? 
25 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
14 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
when you enter a guilty plea today, I will go ahead and if 
I find it appropriate, receive your guilty plea and then I 
will go ahead and sentence you. If your attorney and you 
decide to appeal the pretrial ruling and you prevail on 
appeal, that is the appellate court decides that I was 
wrong, and the gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional 
then you would be allowed to withdraw your guilty plea. 
However, if you appeal and you loose, and the 
appellate court says that I was right, then you're stuck, 
basically. You can't ask the Court to let you withdraw 
your guilty plea. In other words, what you do today would 
be permanent. Did I make a mis-statement? 
MR. YBARRA: Your Honor, I believe that if the 
appeal's court finds that the gang enhancement is not 
constitutional, it would simply, it would be a modification 
of his sentence. It wouldn't be an admission to allow him 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YBARRA: We'd simply strike that part of the 
sentence. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding? 
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's not clear. 
Unfortunately under Gibbons it's unclear whether it would 
invalidate, inviciate the whole plea and whether we would 
15 
1 have to re-enter a five to live plea or not, but Mr. Ybarra 
2 may be correct. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Lopes ought to 
4 understand what's possible under a worse case scenario so I 
5 believe that it's possible under a reading of the case on 
6 Mr. Lopez that if the appellate court says that I was wrong 
7 on the gang enhancement statute that you may not be able to 
8 withdraw your guilty, you may simply have your sentence 
9 adjusted. Now, I understand that there may also be a 
10 possibility that you could withdraw your guilty plea at 
11 that time but I'm not certain about that and I don't know 
12 if anybody is at this point. 
13 MR. PETERSON: We're not, Judge. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. So you understand that 
15 possibility? 
16 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other 
18 questions that you want to ask your attorney or the Court 
19 before we go any further, Mr. Lopes? 
20 MR. LOPES: No. 
21 THE COURT: Counsel, is there anything further 
22 that you would have me inquire of Mr. Lopes before we go 
23 any further? 
24 MR. PETERSON: I don't have anything, your Honor. 
25 MR. YBARRA: I don't believe so, Judge. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Lopes, I'll ask 
2 you to enter your plea at this time. And I'll go through 
3 the information and the enhancements with you. The charge 
4 in case number 961900885 is as follows: In count 1: 
5 Criminal homicide murder. A first degree felony. At 918 
6 South Navajo in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
7 about February 22, 1996, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
8 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
9 that the defendant, Cameron Lopes, as a party to the 
10 offense, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Joey 
11 Mierra and/or said defendant intending to cause serious 
12 bodily to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to 
13 human life that caused the death of Joey Mierra and/or said 
14 defendant, acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
15 indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which 
16 created a great risk of death to another and thereby caused 
17 the death of Joey Mierra. 
18 With notice given pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
19 76-302-203.1 that the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
20 penalty as provided in that section because the above 
21 offense was committed in concert with two or more persons, 
22 further by firearm of a facsimile of a firearm or the 
23 representation of a firearm was used in the commission or 
24 furtherance of the murder giving rise to enhanced penalties 
25 as provided by § 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
17 
amended. To the charge, Mr. Lopes, as I've announced, how 
do you plead, sir? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, could you take that a 
piece at a time if you don't mind. Because I've got to 
preserve Ceri exactly. 
THE COURT: All right, as ~ 
MR. PETERSON: Well — I'm sorry, go ahead. 
THE COURT: As to Count One, criminal homicide 
murder, a first degree felony, Mr. Mierra, excuse me, Mr. 
Lopes, having caused the death of Mr. Mierra. How do you 
plead, sir? 
MR. LOPES: I plead guilty to the last 
alternative, under the last alternative. 
THE COURT: As to evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life that you engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death of another and thereby 
caused the death of Joey Mierra? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I do find, Mr. Lopes, 
that your plea is knowingly and voluntarily made. I'll 
therefore receive it and enter it as a conviction at this 
time. 
As to the other two portions of that, Mr. 
Peterson, how do you wish to proceed? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we wish to enter Ceri 
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1 plea relative to the gang enhancement provision under 7 6-3-
2 203,1. If you want to inquire about this plea, I would 
3 advise Cameron Lopes to say guilty under State vs. Ceri 
4 because we are specifically meaning to appeal the Court's 
5 ruling on the constitutionality of the gang enhancement 
6 provision. Again, our problem is, Judge, that the 
7 legislature has taken a fact finding out of the hands of 
8 the jury and submitted it to the Court unconstitutionally. 
9 THE COURT: All right. As to the gang 
10 enhancement statute found at 76-3-203.1, as to that 
11 enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead? 
12 MR. LOPES: Guilty under State versus Ceri. 
13 THE COURT: All right. And as to the firearm 
14 enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead? 
15 MR. LOPES: Guilty as a party to the offense. 
16 THE COURT: All right. I do find that your plea 
17 of guilty to all of the above is knowingly and voluntarily 
18 made. I'll, therefore, enter them as a conviction at this 
19 time. 
20 Let me tell you about two additional rights that 
21 you have, Mr. Lopez. The first is the right to ask the 
22 Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea if you have good 
23 cause. Any motion that you make to do so, however, has to 
24 be filed within thirty days of today's date. Do you 
25 understand that? 
19 
1 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: And you also have the right to be 
3 sentenced in no less than two days from today's date, no 
4 more than forty-five days from today's date. Do you wish 
5 to be sentenced within that time period? 
6 MR. LOPES: Within two days? 
7 THE COURT: No. The time period begins running 
8 two days from now, goes up to forty-five days. 
9 MR. LOPES: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. I believe a pre-sentence 
11 report is appropriate in this case. Counsel, is there 
12 anything that I need to ask AP&P to address specifically? 
13 MR. PETERSON: I don't believe so, Judge. 
14 MR. YBARRA: I don't know of anything, your 
15 Honor. 
16 THE COURT: All right. I'll ask AP&P to prepare 
17 a presentence report then and I'll set the matter over for 
18 sentencing. 
19 Kathy, we've talked about trying to find another 
20 Wednesday in about 45 days. Can you look and see when that 
21 would be? 
22 Let me ask counsel, the 45 day period would run 
23 on the 25th of September, would you have any objection to 
24 us looking at something in the next week after that? 





























COURT: I'm going 
PETERSON: No, we 





to be gone that week. 
wouldn't because 
time served in < 
All right, • Mr. 
to waive the maximum time for 







so that I 
week and see what my schdule looks 
PETERSON: His concern/ Judge, is that he'd 
like to get sentenced as soon as possible and be on his way 
to the prison. He has had a very difficult in the jail so 
far. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to look at some other 
time before the 25th of September? 
MR. PETERSON: If it's possible. 
THE COURT: I don't know that the pre-sentence 
report will be done but we can certainly try for that. 
MR. PETERSON: All right. But I think it 
probably will, Judge. As far as I know Cameron Lopes has 
two prior offenses and they're misdemeanors. 
THE CLERK: We could do is September 24th. It's 
a Tuesday either nine or nine thirty. 
MR. PETERSON: That'd be fine. I can come over 
on a role call calendar. 
THE COURT: Can you do that also, Mr. Ybarra? 





































right. We'll set the 
What time do 
PETERSON: Nine actually 
you want 
would be 
COURT: Nine? Okay. September 24 
sentencing 
it, nine or 
good for 
at 9:00 
And Mr. Ybarra, will you please give notice to 
the family members of Mr. Mierra who may wish to be present 
at that time? 
MR. YBERRA: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Is there anything else that we need to address 
today? 
MS. CLARK: Your Honor, did you notify him that 
he has a withdraw his plea? I didn't hear that part? 
THE COURT: I did, within the thirty day period, 
I believe I did. 
MR. PETERSON: The last thing we have to address 
is the dismissal of the compansion case. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate that. I will 
grant the State's motion to dismiss Case number 961900816 
and the two additional cases that you mentioned earlier 
which I believe are assigned to Judge Noel. 
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
22 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. PETERSON: No, your Honor, we appreciate the 
special sidings for me. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
23 
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CAROLS ^(il^OOSMI a / . ^ c u A i < • * 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of whj^jl ^$*$ffi£ a r e a s follows: ITn c*t ( 1 
A ^__ 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charges are as follows: 4 T ^ 15 SC A W V ' O 
WAS p<r^4- ^ 4-kfc. p/ircU e-P rv Urns I . A V A^K^^.UL (:'-C>C*W* 
iMm ow4U acccl of 4 U V\oas<L <*r»w^ mtiU <A A c U n a{ 4U W \kd- Mr. ff^ 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at ao cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the court, 
to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I ,(nave not)) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to 
0 C 0 i C 4 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand 
the nature and elements of the charges, mv niiiu'i. in in is and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
fa i r Qi 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorneys facfall fiUc^^ 
(fad {CwilniL ( l i v ^ _, and I have had an'opportunity to discuss this statement, 
my rights and the consequer ices of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know i hat if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against me-or to have them cross-examined by rnv attorney 1 rdso know that I have 
the ngni compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court upon my 
behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do 
so I can not be compelled to testify or give evScience against myself and no advene inferences 
will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that, if I w i sti to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury 
the verdict must be unanimous. 
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9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted bv 
a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford 
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I 
^'—^ 
plead/(guilm (no contest). I know that by pleading tfguiltyj/no contest) to an offense that 
Kj^y^ ^—^ 
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum 
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent (85 %) 
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may 
be ordered by the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
U. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed upon me. 
12, I know and understand that by pleadmg/tguiky$ (no contest) I am waiving my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged 
and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my piea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My piea(s) d^i(guil#f(no contesty(is)ps not) the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in ft8^ff^fo^ this affidavit. 
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14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of-(guilty), (no 
contest i I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation 
or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that 
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding 
on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence -n-t" my kind imc been made to induce 
me to plead guilty, and no promises except, those contained herein and in the attached plea 
agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I 
understand its provisions. I know that 1 am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are uinrct, 
18... I am satisfied «- «ih the .kiwie and assistance of my attorney. 
19. • I am 2C? yean of age; I have attended school through the ''' >Y ' grade and 
I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was 
not under the influence of any drugs, medicatioa or intoxicants which would Impair my judgment 
when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences if my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entering my plea. 
0 0 0 1 0 ? 
DATED this S day of / tb.tit f 
. . & 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
Tcertify that^rm the attorney for (_/)\Ais^^\ hpao ] 
\Ct V*L**~ 
we 
m~ , the 
defendant above, and tha^know^e/ihe has read the statement or thatjrhave read it to (mri/her 
and/Fhave discussed it with/tiir^/her and believe thairfie/^he fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of prfknowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations 
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
FOR ^EFEN^ANlTB AR NUMB^R^ 
CERTEFICATC OF PROSECUTING ATTOI 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
(^J\(MCM/) /
 vp) S , defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the PpL 
defendant and find that the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and 
'the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true 
and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the 
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support ths conviction of defendant for the offense(s) 
al *i Pi j u S 
for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
NG A7TC W^. Wi^ PROSECUTI  T ORNEY/BAR NUMBER 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea 
of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT th« £ day of CU^tA^t~~ 19?'£ 
SANDRA N. PEULER, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE •N, 
